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I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 20, 2014, National Public Radio (“NPR”) reported a 
record high number of American citizens renouncing their 
citizenship worldwide.1 In 2012, 932 individuals renounced their 
 1.   See Ari Shapiro, Why More Americans are Renouncing U.S. Citizenship, 
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U.S. citizenship or terminated their U.S. residency (termed 
“expatriating”).2 In 2013 this number surged to 2,999, the highest 
number in history, and almost thirteen times the number of 
expatriates only five years earlier.3 Even more are expected to 
renounce their citizenship in 2014 and 2015 due to the newly 
implemented law.4 The NPR article reported, “[w]hile individual 
reasons for renouncing may vary from person to person, experts in 
the field say the recent dramatic spike has more to do with the 2010 
tax law [the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act] than any other 
factor.”5 
In 2010, Congress passed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (“FATCA”),6 which requires all foreign financial institutions 
(“FFIs”) doing business with the United States to collect information 
about their U.S. accountholders and disclose that information to the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).7 If an FFI does not fully comply 
NPR (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/02/20/275937138/ 
why-more-americans-are-renouncing-u-s-citizenship (attributing the thirty percent 
increase from 2012 to 2013 to changes in international tax law). 
 2.  See Andrew Mitchel & Ryan E. Dunn, 2013 Expatriations Increase by 
221%, INT’L TAX BLOG (Feb. 6, 2014), http://intltax.typepad.com/intltax_blog/ 
2014/02/2013-expatriations-increase-by-___.html (highlighting that between 1998 
and 2009, the number of American expatriates maintained a gradual incline from 
398 to 742, but dramatically increased after the passage of the Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act in 2009). 
 3.  See Shapiro, supra note 1 (describing the recent increase of expatriates as a 
“sudden spike”); Mitchel & Dunn, supra note 2 (explaining the increase of 
expatriates from 1998 to 2013 as a symptom of changes in tax law); see also 
Quarterly Publication of Individuals Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, 79 Fed. Reg. 
7504 (Feb. 7, 2014) (providing a quarterly notice of individuals who expatriate). 
 4.  See Alex Newman, Amid IRS Abuse, Record Number of Americans Give 
Up U.S. Citizenship, NEW AM. (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.thenewamerican.com/us 
news/congress/item/17134-amid-irs-abuse-record-number-of-americans-give-up-u-
s-citizenship (stating that recent tax reforms will make expatriation more attractive 
to U.S. citizens). 
 5.  Shapiro, supra note 1. 
 6.  Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, H.R. 2847, 111th Cong. § 
501 (2010). Congress passed FATCA legislation in a large legislative package 
directed at job creation. The provisions implementing FATCA are contained in 
sections 1471 through 1474 of the Internal Revenue Code. For more details about 
FATCA’s provisions, see sources cited infra note 7. 
 7.  See generally Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax- 
Compliance-Act-FATCA (last updated Jan. 13, 2015) [hereinafter FATCA History] 
(providing brief background information about FATCA); Resource Center: 
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with FATCA’s requirements, including the requirement to identify 
all U.S.-held accounts, the act imposes a thirty percent withholding 
on U.S. payments passing through the institution.8 
Unsurprisingly, the reaction to FATCA from the international 
community has included opposition, as many claim the U.S. tax law 
is an overreaching and onerous breach of privacy and foreign 
sovereignty.9 In response to public comments on FATCA, and the 
realization that FFIs would attempt to avoid FATCA by refusing to 
serve U.S. clientele abroad, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
published a Model FATCA Agreement (“U.S. Model”)10 that 
includes an addendum with an anti-discrimination provision 
explicitly prohibiting FFIs from discriminating against U.S. 
persons.11 Currently, the United States has FATCA agreements 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx 
(last updated Dec. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Resource Center: FATCA] (providing 
detailed information about FATCA, including press releases and model 
intergovernmental agreements). 
 8.  See FATCA History, supra note 7 (“U.S. financial institutions and other 
U.S withholding agents must both withhold 30% on certain payments to foreign 
entities that do not document their FATCA status and report information about 
certain non-financial foreign entities.”). 
 9.  See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, Analysis: Critics Say New Law Makes Them 
Tax Agents, REUTERS (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/19/ 
us-usa-tax-fatca-idUSTRE77I38220110819 (quoting an American senior finance 
executive in Hong Kong as stating FATCA is “America’s most imperialist act 
since it invaded the Philippine Islands in 1899”); id. (noting that backlash from 
numerous foreign banks led to the U.S. Department of the Treasury delaying the 
implementation date of FATCA). 
 10.  See Treasury Releases Model Intergovernmental Agreement for 
Implementing the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act to Improve Offshore Tax 
Compliance and Reduce Burden, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (July 26, 2012), 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1653.aspx [hereinafter 
Treasury Releases Model] (announcing the release of the first two versions of the 
U.S. Model developed in conjunction with France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom); see also Resource Center: FATCA, supra note 7 (explaining 
that the U.S. Department of the Treasury currently has multiple versions of the 
model agreement, one for agreements reached before the enactment of FATCA and 
one for agreements reached after the enactment). 
 11.  See, e.g., Model 1 IGA Annex II, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-
Annex-II-to-Model-1-Agreement-11-4-13.pdf [hereinafter Annex II] (“The 
Financial Institution must not have policies or practices that discriminate against 
opening or maintaining Financial Accounts for individuals who are Specified U.S. 
Persons and residents of [Canada].”). 
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signed and in effect with fifty-six jurisdictions;12 of these, all except 
Canada’s contain the U.S. Model anti-discrimination provision in the 
final FATCA agreement.13 The U.S.-Canada Income Tax Convention 
(“ITC”),14 which memorializes the FATCA agreement between the 
United States and Canada, not only omits the anti-discrimination 
clause, but provides no other similar protections for U.S. persons 
within the ITC. 
As predicted, since the passage of Canada’s FATCA, Americans 
in Canada have repeatedly complained of being shut out from doing 
business in Canadian financial institutions15—exactly what the anti-
discrimination clause in the U.S. Model would have served to 
prevent. The inability of these individuals to access such basic 
financial services limits their ability to, among many other 
limitations, efficiently manage finances with checking and savings 
accounts, pay bills or rent online or with debit and credit cards, tax 
plan, job hunt, or apply for certain tax credits.16 
Given the sweeping changes that FATCA brings to the 
international tax information exchange arena, and because 
discrimination on the basis of U.S. national origin is one of the 
anticipated consequences of FATCA, should Canada be precluded 
from omitting the U.S. Model’s anti-discrimination clause from its 
tax treaty? This Comment analyzes whether Canada’s FATCA, 
which omits the U.S. Model’s anti-discrimination clause, is a 
violation of Canada’s obligations under the International Covenant 
 12.  See Resource Center: FATCA-Archive, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA-
Archive.aspx (last updated Jan. 8, 2015) (listing another fifty-six jurisdictions that 
signed FATCA agreements, but have not reached an agreement in substance like 
the fifty-six jurisdictions mentioned above). 
 13.  Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of Canada to Improve International Tax Compliance Through 
Enhanced Exchange of Information under the Convention Between the United 
States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, 
U.S.-Can., Feb. 5, 2014, T.I.A.S. 14-627 [hereinafter U.S.-Can. FATCA 
Agreement]. 
 14.  Convention Between Canada and the United States of America with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, U.S.-Can., Sept. 26, 1980, 1469 
U.N.T.S. 189 [hereinafter Income Tax Convention]; see U.S.-Can. FATCA 
Agreement, supra note 13. 
 15.  See discussion infra Part II. 
 16.  See discussion infra Part III. 
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on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),17 a multilateral human 
rights treaty that guarantees individuals freedom from discrimination 
on the grounds of, among other protected classes, national origin.18 
This Comment argues that Canada’s FATCA, absent an anti-
discrimination clause, violates the ICCPR. 
Part II of the Comment presents a background of the international 
tax compliance framework, discusses relevant case law that led to the 
passage of the U.S. FATCA in 2010, and highlights key provisions 
of the law. Part III analyzes Canada’s recently passed FATCA 
agreement (“Canada’s FATCA”),19 which omits the anti-
discrimination clause of the U.S. Model. This Part argues that the 
omission of the anti-discrimination clause is a violation of 
international law, vis-à-vis its incongruity with the anti-
discriminatory purpose of the ICCPR.20 Part III also asserts that, 
pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna 
Convention”),21 the Supreme Court of Canada should find the anti-
discrimination clause in the U.S. Model persuasive to its 
interpretation of FATCA. 
Part IV recommends that (1) Canada amend its FATCA to include 
the U.S. Model’s anti-discrimination clause; (2) the United States 
should subsidize the cost of FATCA’s implementation in Canada to 
prevent discrimination against U.S. persons in Canada; or (3) the 
United Nations’ Human Rights Committee should find that Canada’s 
FATCA, absent anti-discrimination protections, violates the 
ICCPR.22 Finally, the Comment concludes that Canada’s FATCA, as 
it is currently set forth, violates the ICCPR because it does not 
effectively guarantee protection from discrimination.23 
 17.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1979) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 18.  See id. arts. 2(2), 26 (“[T]he law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on 
any ground such as . . . national . . . origin.”). 
 19.  An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in 
Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-31 (Can.). 
 20.  See discussion infra Part III. 
 21.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 15, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 22.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 23.  See discussion infra Part V. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Unique amongst developed countries, the United States taxes its 
citizens on worldwide income.24 This means that no matter where a 
U.S. citizen or resident lives, or where the income is earned, he or 
she must file annual income tax returns and pay associated taxes.25 
A. INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPLIANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES’ 
PERSPECTIVE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Because the United States collects federal income tax primarily 
through “voluntary compliance,” a process where a taxpayer or entity 
assesses and self-reports its own tax liability, and makes the 
appropriate tax payments to cover the liability, the IRS continuously 
combats underreporting of tax liability, non-filing of tax returns, and 
underpayment of taxes.26 In combatting these problems, one 
successful method of enforcement for the IRS is to require 
withholding of estimated taxes.27 This occurs when the payor of 
taxable income, such as an employer, is required to withhold a 
portion of a taxable payment (such as withholding a percentage of 
wages from an employee) and submits the payment to the IRS for 
 24.  See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (2014) (defining income to include “all income from 
whatever source derived”); see also Don Whiteley, Canada Capitulates on FATCA 
Agreement, BC BUS. (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.bcbusiness.ca/finance/canada-
capitulates-on-fatca-agreement (“The U.S. is one of only two countries in the 
world (the other is Eritrea) that levies income tax based on citizenship rather than 
residence.”). 
 25.  See 26 U.S.C. § 911 (governing the filing of income tax for citizens and 
residents of the United States living abroad); id. § 6012 (requiring “[e]very 
individual having for the taxable year gross income” to file income tax returns). 
See generally Information for U.S. Citizens or Dual Citizens Residing Outside the 
U.S., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Information-
for-U.S.-Citizens-or-Dual-Citizens-Residing-Outside-the-U.S. (last updated Feb. 
12, 2014) (providing general tax filing information and instructions for U.S. 
citizens who live outside the United States, including the requirement that all U.S. 
citizens must file “federal income tax return[s] for any tax year in which [their] 
gross incomes [are] equal to or greater than the applicable exemption amount and 
standard deduction”). 
 26.  See generally Mark R. Van Heukelom, Note, The Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act and Foreign Insurance Companies: Better to Comply than To Opt 
Out, 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 155, 158 (2013) (providing an overview of income tax 
collection through voluntary compliance). 
 27.  Id. (citing Lily Kahng, Investment Income Withholding in the United States 
and Germany, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 315, 323 (2011)). 
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application towards the employee’s tax obligation.28 At the end of the 
taxable year, if the withholding paid to the IRS equals the taxpayer’s 
obligation, the IRS has fully collected the liability.29 Indeed, the IRS 
states that when income is reported dually to both the IRS and the 
taxpayer (such as wages in the previous example), the income has a 
ninety-nine percent likelihood of being reported on the taxpayer’s 
return.30 
On the other hand, in cases where dual reporting is not required, 
this percentage drops to just forty-four percent.31 Consequently, in 
the realm of international taxation—where withholding has rarely 
been practical due to differing tax assessments and requirements 
around the world—U.S. tax compliance and effective tax 
enforcement issues are much more complex.32 
1. Voluntary Compliance Measures 
The IRS has recognized that U.S. taxpayers with international 
income sources or dual citizenship might not file their U.S. income 
taxes properly, intentionally or not.33 In addition, differing local laws 
governing bank secrecy and information privacy have made it 
difficult for the IRS to reliably determine the accuracy of a tax 
filing.34 As a result, both the taxpayer and the IRS have been at the 
mercy of various voluntary compliance procedures to help ensure 
proper filing. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Karl Kuepper, Oliver von Schweinitz & Mark Orlic, How FATCA Will 
Impact Financial Services in Germany, INT’L TAX REV. (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3130149/How-FATCA-will-
impact-financial-services-in-Germany.html. 
 31.  See id. (remarking that an example where dual reporting is not required is 
capital gains earned in overseas accounts). 
 32.  See Van Heukelom, supra note 26, at 158 (noting that voluntary 
compliance is less effective internationally than domestically) (citing Melissa A. 
Dizdarevic, Comment, The FATCA Provisions of the Hire Act: Boldly Going 
Where No Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2967, 2972 
(2011)). 
 33.  See Information for U.S. Citizens or Dual Citizens Residing Outside the 
U.S., supra note 25 (recognizing that some taxpayers who are dual citizens of the 
United States and a foreign country may fail to timely file). 
 34.  See Van Heukelom, supra note 26, at 157-58 (stating that differences in 
national laws can create conditions for tax fraud across borders). 
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The IRS implemented two primary methods of voluntary 
compliance in international taxation. The first is the U.S. taxpayer’s 
disclosure of foreign bank accounts in a Report of Foreign Bank and 
Financial Accounts (“FBAR”), submitted annually to the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury.35 The FBAR requires the taxpayer to 
report information about foreign financial accounts exceeding 
$10,000, or face fines and penalties.36 However, because the FBAR 
is a method of self-reporting, it has not been particularly effective in 
curtailing taxpayer noncompliance.37 
Thus, in 2000 the IRS implemented a second method of voluntary 
disclosure known as the Qualified Intermediary (“QI”) program.38 In 
the QI program, participating FFIs volunteer to “‘withhold and 
report’ tax on subjected income in exchange for certain benefits” 
from the IRS.39 Critics of the QI program have pointed out that 
although “this scheme induced foreign banks to cooperate with the 
IRS, the complicated and often indirect nature of international 
financial transactions limited the scheme’s effectiveness.”40 
2. The Swiss Bank Scandal 
Given the tame nature of these voluntary approaches, some argued 
that, until recently, the United States did not take international tax 
evasion seriously.41 The increasing gap between the taxes owed to 
 35.  See generally New Legislation Could Affect Filers of the Report of Foreign 
Bank and Financial Accounts, but Potential Issues are Being Addressed, U.S. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/ 
2010reports/201030125fr.html (providing an overview of the Bank Secrecy Act of 
1970 and the IRS’s subsequent creation of the Form FBAR to assist taxpayers in 
complying with the Bank Secrecy Act). 
 36.  Id.; see Mitchel & Dunn, supra note 2 (explaining that the standard penalty 
for unintentional failure to file the FBAR is $10,000 per Form per year; the penalty 
for willful failure to file is the greater of $100,000 or fifty percent of the account 
balance at the time of the violation). 
 37.  See Van Heukelom, supra note 26, at 158. 
 38.  See generally Qualified Intermediary Frequently Asked Questions, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-
Businesses/Qualified-Intermediary-Frequently-Asked-Questions (last updated Jan. 
27, 2015) (providing an overview of the Qualified Intermediary program). 
 39.  Van Heukelom, supra note 26, at 158. 
 40.  Id. (noting that the drawback of the QI program is that most foreign 
income subject to U.S. taxation passes through U.S. withholding agents, rather 
than Qualified Intermediaries). 
 41.  See Lee A. Sheppard, Will U.S. Hypocrisy on Information Sharing 
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the IRS on international transactions and the taxes actually collected 
each year from these sources,42 compounded by the need to raise 
revenue during the 2008 American economic crisis, have prompted 
drastic change in U.S. tax collection efforts.43 
In 2009, former banker Bradley Birkenfeld of UBS bank, a bank 
participating in the IRS’s voluntary QI program in Switzerland, 
turned tax evasion into worldwide news when he blew the whistle on 
his bank’s scheme to defraud the IRS.44 In United States v. UBS 
Continue?, TAX ANALYSTS 1, 3 (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.taxanalysts.com 
/www/features.nsf/Articles/0C26B2CFD92F1FBE85257AFC004E8B38?OpenDoc
ument (highlighting that tax evasion was not taken seriously before the 2009 Swiss 
Bank case discussed infra Part II). 
 42.  Compare 156 CONG. REC. S1635-36 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010) (statement 
of Sen. Levin) (estimating that tax-dodging schemes cost the Federal Treasury 
$100 billion a year), with Frederic Behrens, Comment, Using a Sledgehammer to 
Crack a Nut: Why FATCA Will Not Stand, WIS. L. REV. 205, 207 (2013) 
(estimating that offshore personal income tax evasion results in $40-70 billion in 
revenue lost yearly), and Kuepper, supra note 30 (“The gross tax gap has 
grown . . . since [the IRS’s] previous estimate for tax year 2001, increasing from 
$345 billion to $450 billion for tax year 2006.”). The deficit varies depending on 
the measure used (e.g., annual, gross, and net losses). 
 43.  See Shapiro, supra note 1 (commenting that the economic recession 
coupled with the UBS Swiss Bank scandal gave lawmakers a chance to “bring in 
massive sums of money and stop tax cheats at the same time”); see, e.g., 
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 353 (2005) (rejecting the long-
standing “revenue rule,” which prohibited enforcement of foreign tax laws in 
domestic courts, thereby allowing the prosecution of Americans who violated 
Canadian tax law in U.S. courts). 
 44.  See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, Wealthy Americans Under Scrutiny in UBS 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/06/business/ 
worldbusiness/06tax.html?_r=1& (providing background information on Mr. 
Birkenfeld); Miles Costello, US Claims UBS ‘Colluded’ Behind Secrecy Laws, 
TIMES ONLINE (July 18, 2008), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/ 
banking/article2157858.ece; Carlyn Kolker, Union Charter’s Birkenfeld Resigns 
After Arrest in Tax Scheme, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2008), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=akUn9kowF0Vk 
(shedding light on the indictment against Mr. Birkenfeld who helped Igor 
Olenicoff hide $200 million of assets in foreign countries); Evan Perez, Offshore 
Tax Evasion Costs U.S. $100 Billion, Senate Probe of UBS, LGT Indicates, WALL 
ST. J. (July 17, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121624391105859731; 
Laura Saunders & Robin Sidel, Whistleblower Gets $104 Million, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444017504577 
645412614237708. Other tax evasion scandals unfolded during the same time 
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AG,45 the U.S. government sued Switzerland’s largest bank to try to 
force disclosure of the identities of approximately 52,000 American 
customers who allegedly hid their secret Swiss accounts from U.S. 
tax authorities.46 According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
Complaint, U.S. customers failed to report and pay taxes on income 
earned from accounts that held about $14.8 billion in assets.47 Acting 
Assistant Attorney General for the Department’s Tax Division, John 
A. DiCicco, commented that “[a]t a time when millions of 
Americans are losing their jobs, their homes and their health care, it 
is appalling that more than 50,000 of the wealthiest among us have 
actively sought to evade their civic and legal duty to pay taxes.”48 
Under threat of criminal proceedings, UBS paid $780 million in fines 
to the IRS and turned over the names of more than 4,000 U.S. 
taxpayers who had maintained Swiss bank accounts.49 
UBS Bank, previously a QI, demonstrated the weakness of the 
voluntary compliance system.50 The Swiss Bank case sparked debate 
about U.S. efforts in ensuring tax compliance overseas and propelled 
 45.  No. 09-60033, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66739 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2009). 
 46.  See id. at *2 (seeking to compel UBS to disclose records of the “John Doe” 
class of U.S. taxpayers); Peter Nelson, Note, Conflicts of Interest: Resolving Legal 
Barriers to the Implementation of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 32 
VA. TAX REV. 387, 391 (2012) (noting that UBS misled U.S. authorities by hiding 
the true residency status of their U.S. accountholders and thereby allowed them to 
escape U.S. taxation). 
 47.  United States Asks Court to Enforce Summons for UBS Swiss Bank 
Account Records, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/united-states-asks-court-enforce-summons-ubs-swiss-bank-account-records. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See Excerpts from IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman’s Press Remarks on 
UBS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/uac/ 
Excerpts-from-IRS-Commissioner-Doug-Shulman%27s-Press-Remarks-on-UBS 
(explaining that this action sends the message to all U.S. taxpayers that their efforts 
to hide assets will fail); IRS to Receive Unprecedented Amount of Information in 
UBS Agreement, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/ 
uac/IRS-to-Receive-Unprecedented-Amount-of-Information-in-UBS-Agreement 
(stating that UBS turned over all requested information); UBS Enters Into Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 18, 2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ubs-enters-deferred-prosecution-agreement 
(announcing that UBS Bank admitted to helping U.S. taxpayers hide accounts from 
the IRS, and that the bank agreed to identify those customers, and pay $780 million 
in fines, penalties, interest, and restitution). 
 50.  See Sheppard, supra note 41, at 5 (stating that there is no requirement that 
banks “rat out U.S. customers hiding behind foreign entities”). 
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Congress to change its approach towards tax havens and shelters.51 
Thus began the enactment of an international tax compliance scheme 
that shifts from voluntary to mandatory compliance. 
B. THE SHIFT TO MANDATORY COMPLIANCE: THE UNITED 
STATES PASSES FATCA 
In the wake of the Swiss Bank scandal, Congress passed FATCA 
as part of the 2010 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act.52 
The law aims to “advance U.S. tax collection and enforcement 
efforts abroad and recoup the estimated hundreds of billions of 
dollars lost each year due to tax evasion.”53 The primary reason 
FATCA departs so drastically from previous methods of foreign 
asset disclosure, such as the FBAR and QI program, is that for 
noncompliant FFIs, FATCA imposes a mandatory thirty percent 
withholding of payments passing from U.S. payors to the 
institution.54 
In brief, FATCA requires that any FFI55 that intends to invest in a 
U.S. asset (whether for itself or a client): sign a contract with the IRS 
in which it promises to review existing accounts to identify all U.S. 
persons;56 implement procedures to monitor new accounts for the 
 51.  See ERIKA K. LUNDER & CAROL A. PETTIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R43444, REPORTING FOREIGN FINANCIAL ASSETS UNDER TITLES 26 AND 31: 
FATCA AND FBAR 6 (2014) (commenting that the shortcomings of the voluntary 
compliance programs, along with the UBS case, influenced Congress to enact 
more stringent reporting requirements, such as those presented in FATCA). 
 52.  H.R. 2847, 111th Cong. § 501 (2010). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See Behrens, supra note 42, at 209 (stating an unintended consequence is 
that “FFIs facing heavy compliance costs might determine that it is easier to drop 
American clients and investments than to comply with FATCA.”). The 
withholding threatens a substantial source of revenue for financial institutions 
involved with U.S. payors. 
 55.  See 26 U.S.C. § 1471(d)(5) (2010) (defining “financial institutions” as any 
foreign entity that collects deposits in the fashion of a bank; maintains financial 
assets for others as a substantial portion of its business; or is primarily in the 
business of investing in a wide range of securities or other interests); see also 
FATCA Information for Foreign Financial Institutions and Entities, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Information-for-
Foreign-Financial-Institutions (last updated July 11, 2014) (detailing the 
requirements that FACTA places on foreign banks). 
 56.  See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, 2011-19 I.R.B. 765 (May 9, 2011) (defining 
“U.S. person” as an individual or entity with any of these U.S. indicia: U.S. 
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same purpose; agree to provide the IRS with annual information 
about these accounts;57 and agree to deduct and withhold a thirty 
percent tax for any accountholders that will not comply.58 If a 
financial institution is deemed noncompliant in these requirements, 
then U.S. payors must withhold thirty percent of the gross payments 
made to U.S. accountholders.59 
1. Canada’s Reaction to FATCA 
Not surprisingly, the international community—especially FFIs 
and those who would experience the trickledown effect of harm 
caused to those institutions —reacted with outrage over FATCA.60 
FATCA’s incongruity with other foreign privacy, bank secrecy, 
access to banking, and discrimination laws is a top concern for 
Canadian financial institutions and bankers.61 Banks were 
particularly worried they would be compelled to collect and disclose 
information about U.S. customers, only to be sued by those 
citizenship or lawful permanent resident (green card) status; a U.S. birthplace; a 
U.S. residence address or a U.S. correspondence address (including a U.S. P.O. 
box); standing instructions to transfer funds to an account maintained in the United 
States, or directions regularly received from a U.S. address; an “in care of” address 
or a “hold mail” address that is the sole address with respect to the client; or a 
power of attorney or signatory authority granted to a person with a U.S. address). 
 57.  See 26 U.S.C. § 1471(c)(1) (information about U.S. accountholders 
disclosed to the IRS includes the accountholder’s name, address, tax identification 
number, account numbers and balances, and gross receipts and withdrawals for 
each account). 
 58.  See id. § 1471(b)(1)(D)(i) (applying the tax to all passthru payments). 
 59.  See Behrens, supra note 42, at 214 (calling it a “penalty for failure to 
report tax obligations.”); IRS and Treasury Department Propose “Phase-In” of 
FACTA Requirements, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 2 (July 15, 2011), 
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_FATCA_Postpon
ed_Deadlines.pdf (characterizing the payments as “withholdable payments”). In 
addition, if any foreign laws prohibit disclosure of the information because of 
conflict of local law rules, the financial institution must submit a waiver. I.R.C. § 
1472. 
 60.  See, e.g., Browning, supra note 9 (noting Australia, Switzerland, Hong 
Kong, the European Banking Federation, and the Institute of International 
Bankers’ discontent with FATCA). 
 61.  See Canada and U.S. Reach Agreement on Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act, DEP’T OF FIN. CAN. (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.fin.gc.ca/n14/14-
018-eng.asp [hereinafter Canada and U.S. Reach Agreement] (describing concerns 
of the Canadian banking community as including conflict of laws issues, such as 
the Canadian Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations and the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and FACTA). 
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customers for privacy, due diligence, and discrimination claims.62 
Local Canadian laws, such as the Access to Basic Banking Services 
Regulations (“ABBS”),63 which prohibits banks from requiring 
identification more than those enumerated in the law (none of which 
includes the identification sources that FATCA requires institutions 
to collect),64 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom 
(“Canadian Charter”), which prohibits discrimination,65 could be 
violated in the financial institution’s pursuit of identifying U.S. 
persons within the meaning of FATCA.66 
Debates during the passage of the Canadian legislation 
implementing FATCA illuminated Canadians’ disdain for the law 
and the feeling that the United States was overreaching in its 
approach to international tax compliance.67 For example, U.S.-born  
 
 
 62.  See id. (commenting on the fear from Canadian financial institutions of 
being forced to disclose information regarding U.S. taxpayers); see also Letter 
from Peter van Dijk, Senior Vice President of Taxation, TD Bank Fin. Grp., to the 
Honorable Michael Mundaca, Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Treasury, and the 
Honorable Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. (Apr. 4, 2011) 
(voicing concern from TD Bank Financial Group); Patrick Cain, Dual Citizens Sue 
Feds Over FATCA Tax Deal with U.S., GLOBAL NEWS (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://globalnews.ca/news/1504452/dual-citizens-sue-feds-over-fatca-deal-letting-
banks-pass-info-to-irs [hereinafter Cain, Dual Citizens] (discussing a lawsuit based 
on U.S. constitutional grounds filed by Canadian-U.S. dual citizens regarding the 
FATCA deal). 
 63.  Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations, SOR/2003-184 (Can.). 
 64.  See id. (allowing for only one source of photo identification). 
 65.  See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter 
Canadian Charter] (“Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the 
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination 
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”). The US-Canada 
legislation implementing FATCA requires information-gathering and disclosure 
procedures that effectively treat individuals differently and adversely based on an 
immutable personal characteristic, citizenship—whether or not acknowledged or 
desired by the individual. 
 66.  See, e.g., Letter from Peter van Dijk to Michael Mundaca & Douglas 
Shulman, supra note 62 (suggesting FATCA alternatives to the IRS 
Commissioner). 
 67.  See, e.g., 147 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2014) 071 (Can.) (“[T]he U.S. 
has no right to impose sanctions on Canadian banks. It says it does. We should 
challenge it in international court.”). 
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Canadian Parliament member Elizabeth May stated during the 
parliamentary debate: 
It is clear that FATCA is advantageous for the United States alone. There 
is nothing in it to help Canadians. As the lawyers and legal experts 
explained, the only reason why the Government of Canada accepted this 
agreement, which will violate the rights of Canadians, is that the U.S. 
government threatened to impose sanctions on our banks.68 
2. The U.S. Model Anti-Discrimination Clause 
From 2010 through 2012, in an attempt to help clarify and 
implement FATCA, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the 
IRS published a series of preliminary notices and proposed 
regulations.69 Based on the public comments received, in January 
2013, the IRS issued final regulations for FATCA, asserting that 
bilateral intergovernmental agreements would facilitate the exchange 
of tax compliance information.70 The U.S. Department of Treasury 
published the U.S. Model that would serve as a starting point for 
bilateral negotiations between the United States and FATCA partner 
countries.71 
The U.S. Model allows FFIs to be “deemed compliant,” and 
therefore not subject to the thirty percent withholding, so long as 
they meet certain conditions.72 In addition, the agreement allows the 
home country of an FFI to take responsibility for collecting the 
information disclosures (as opposed to requiring the foreign financial 
institution to report directly to the IRS), thereby relieving the  
 
 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See I.R.S. Notice 2011-53, 2011-32 I.R.B. 124 (Aug. 8, 2011) (discussing 
withholding, documentation, and reporting requirements); I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, 
2011-19 I.R.B. 765 (May 9, 2011) (explaining the reporting requirements imposed 
on FFIs); I.R.S. Notice 2010-60, 2010-37 I.R.B. 329 (Sept. 13, 2010) (notifying 
stakeholders of important FATCA implementation information). 
 70.  See T.D. 9610, 2013-15 I.R.B. 766 (referencing the joint view of Treasury 
and the IRS). 
 71.  Treasury Releases Model, supra note 10. 
 72.  Treasury and IRS Issue Final Regulations to Combat Offshore Tax 
Evasion, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/press-




626 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [30:3 
institution of liability for disclosing information in violation of 
privacy laws.73 
Moreover, as the Treasury Regulation notes, “[t]he final 
regulations also add as a condition . . . that ‘the FFI not have policies 
or practices that discriminate against opening or maintaining 
accounts for U.S. individuals that are resident in the local FFI’s 
country.’”74 Among the agreement’s many complex and technical 
requirements, this anti-discrimination clause is the only provision 
that directly and expressly defends against the discrimination that 
U.S. persons abroad would soon face as a result of FATCA’s 
implementation. 
3. The U.S.-Canada Income Tax Convention Implementing FATCA 
FATCA is not the first agreement of its kind for the United States 
or Canada. Before FATCA, the United States had bilateral income 
tax conventions (“ITCs”) with sixty-five countries.75 These ITCs are 
largely based on model language from the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”).76 Canada has 
an even larger network of preexisting bilateral tax treaties, 
amounting to approximately ninety-two.77 These tax treaties 
generally allow the taxes of residents of one treaty country to be 
reduced from taxes of the other treaty country to prevent double 
 73.  See id. In reference to the potential for FATCA to violate Canadian 
privacy laws, Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty stated, “Canada engaged in 
lengthy negotiations with the U.S. government to address our concerns and, as a 
result, significant exemptions and other relief were obtained.” Canada and U.S. 
Reach Agreement, supra note 61. Accounts that will not be reportable under 
FATCA include: Registered Retirement Savings Plans, Retirement Income Funds, 
Disability Savings Plans, and Tax-Free Savings Accounts. In addition, small 
deposit-taking institutions, such as credit unions, with assets of less than $175 
million will be exempt. Id. 
 74.  78 Fed. Reg. 5874, 5890 (Jan. 28, 2013). 
 75.  Charles Gustafson, The USA, in THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN 
MODEL CONVENTIONS ON BILATERAL TAX TREATIES 1149 (Michael Lang et al. 
eds., 2012). 
 76.  MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (Org. Econ Co-
Operation & Dev. July 22, 2010). 
 77.  See Catherine Brown & Martha O’Brien, Canada, in THE IMPACT OF THE 
OECD AND UN MODEL CONVENTIONS ON BILATERAL TAX TREATIES 203, n.1 
(Michael Lang et al. eds., 2012) (explaining that Canada is an open economy 
dependent on trade, with a large network of bilateral tax treaties). 
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taxation of the same income.78 Furthermore, to safeguard against tax 
evasion, the ITCs typically provide for the exchange of tax 
information between governments upon request when related to 
specific criminal or civil tax matters that are under investigation.79 
The United States’ ITCs are based on the U.S. Model Income Tax 
Convention, but vary from country to country.80 The United States 
and Canada signed their ITC, named the Convention with Respect to 
Taxes on Income and on Capital, in 1980.81 To implement FATCA, 
in 2014 the United States and Canada signed an intergovernmental 
agreement, and the Canadian Parliament passed the agreement as law 
under the existing U.S.-Canada ITC82 as an agreement to “Improve 
International Tax Compliance through Enhanced Exchange of 
Information.”83 
C. TAX TREATY INTERPRETATION 
When interpreting treaty provisions, it is common to refer to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.84 Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention states that treaties are to be “interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and 
purpose.”85 In addition to the treaty text, the Vienna Convention 
 78.  See JONATHAN SCHWARZ, SCHWARZ ON TAX TREATIES 21 (3d ed. 2013) 
(“[A]lmost all tax treaties were bilateral and principally aimed at preventing 
double taxation.”). 
 79.  See id. (allowing for mutual benefits via information sharing). 
 80.  See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., 
Dec. 31, 1975, 31 U.S.T. 5668 (resembling the OECD Model Convention); see 
also Gustafson, supra note 75, at 1150 (noting that the U.S. Treasury has declined 
to embrace the OECD Model for its basic treaty negotiating position). 
 81.  Income Tax Convention, supra note 14. 
 82.  Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of Canada to Improve International Tax Compliance Through 
Enhanced Exchange of Information Under the Convention Between the United 
States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, 
U.S.-Can., Feb. 5, 2014, T.I.A.S. No. 14-627. 
 83.  See An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in 
Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-31 (Can.). 
 84.  See Gustafson, supra note 75, at 1150 (stating that the Vienna Convention 
often “represents the ‘best evidence’ of customary international law with respect to 
treaty interpretation and administration”). 
 85.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 21, art. 31(1) (instructing that the 
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explains that the “context” includes “[a]ny instrument which was 
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty.”86 
Canadian courts have repeatedly held that this interpretation is the 
primary rule for interpreting its tax treaty with the United States. For 
example, in TD Sec. (USA) LLC v. R,87 the Tax Court of Canada 
interpreted whether the Canada-U.S. ITC provided Canadian 
residency status (and therefore certain treaty benefits) to a U.S.-
based bank with a branch office in Canada.88 The court referred to 
not only the ITC’s text, but OECD Model documents and the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury’s Technical Explanation of the treaty to 
aid its interpretation.89 The Tax Court concluded that the surrounding 
documents provided persuasive instruction on the ITC’s intent and 
ultimately applied treaty benefits to the bank.90 The decision 
illustrated the court’s practical approach in interpreting and applying 
ITC provisions.91 
D. CANADA’S ACCESSION TO THE ICCPR 
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the ICCPR, a core 
international human rights treaty, on December 16, 1966.92 The 
Canadian government acceded to the ICCPR in May 1976 and 
thereupon became bound to its terms.93 
 
Pursuant to articles 2(2) and 26 of the ICCPR, Canada agreed to 
respect human rights and ensure their application without 
primary source for treaty interpretation is the ordinary meaning of the text of the 
treaty itself). 
 86.  Id. art. 31(2)(b). 
 87.  [2010] 5 C.T.C. 2426 (Can.). 
 88.  Id. ¶ 50. 
 89.  Id. ¶ 61. 
 90.  Id. ¶ 97. 
 91.  See also Crown Forest Indus. Ltd. v. Canada, [1995] S.C.R. 802 (Can.) 
(exemplifying the cases before the Supreme Court of Canada that are interpreting 
this world). 
 92.  ICCPR, supra note 17. 
 93.  See Privy Council Decision no. 1976-1156, May 18, 1976. The ICCPR 
entered into force formally in Canada in August 1976. Canada acceded to the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, as well. 
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discrimination to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction.94 Specifically, Canada vowed, “[w]here not already 
provided for by existing legislative or other measures,” it would 
“take the necessary steps . . . to adopt such laws or other measures as 
may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.”95 
Article 26 of the ICCPR expressly guarantees all persons equal 
and effective protection against discrimination: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law 
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.96 
Upon accession to the treaty, Canada committed itself to ensure 
that any individual whose ICCPR rights were violated would receive 
an effective remedy under national law.97 Thus far, Canada has 
declared that it still stands by that 1976 commitment.98 
III. ANALYSIS 
The omission of the anti-discrimination clause in Canada’s 
FATCA is in direct conflict with the ICCPR’s guarantee of freedom 
from discrimination on the basis of national origin.99 This section 
 94.  ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 26. 
 95.  Id. art. 2(2) (emphasis added). 
 96.  Id. art. 26. 
 97.  Id. art. 2(3). 
 98.  See id. art. 40 (stating that ICCPR State Parties are required to submit 
reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to ICCPR rights); 
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Sixth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 
October 2010 – Canada, ¶¶ 7-10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/Can/6 (Apr. 9, 2013), 
available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.as 
px?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fCAN%2f6&Lang=en (“Canada wishes to 
emphasize that the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) and the 
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (CHRT) have a broad mandate with respect to 
discrimination complaints.”); see also Reporting to the Human Rights Committee: 
The Canadian Experience, 38 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 261, 283-84 (2000) (providing 
an overview of the first four reports submitted by Canada). 
 99.  See ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 26. 
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analyzes the incongruity of Canada’s FATCA with the ICCPR, 
specifically: how Canada’s FACTA allows FFIs to discriminate in 
violation of ICCPR article 26; Canada’s failure to pass legislation 
protecting rights found in article 2 of the ICPPR; and the lack of an 
applicable exception under the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (“HRC”)’s discrimination jurisprudence.100 This section 
also analyzes the persuasiveness of the U.S. Model FATCA 
Agreement’s anti-discrimination clause to the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s interpretation of the U.S.-Canada ITC. 
A. BECAUSE CANADA’S FATCA CONSTITUTES FEDERAL LAW, IT 
MUST BE CONGRUENT WITH THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN THE 
ICCPR. 
Intergovernmental agreements (“IGAs”), like those the United 
States is bilaterally negotiating with foreign countries to implement 
FATCA, are the result of voluntary negotiations among federal 
governments, and not binding in and of themselves.101 Only when a 
federal law is subsequently passed to implement the IGA does the 
law become binding and is thereafter required to comply with other 
federal and international law. Thus, although an IGA implementing 
FATCA cannot violate international law, a federal law and other 
international law implementing FATCA can.102 
On February 4, 2014, Canada signed the U.S.-Canada IGA and 
then released federal legislation to implement FATCA as part of 
Canada’s budget bill on March 28, 2014,103 despite widespread 
 100.  See also Whiteley, supra note 24 (arguing that FATCA likely violates 
several other international treaties, such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and the World Trade Organization as well). 
 101.  See Arthur Benz, Multilevel Parliaments in Canada and Europe, 66 INT’L 
J. 109, 122 (2010-2011) (“[N]o constitutional provision stipulates obligatory 
cooperation.”). 
 102.  See id. (providing a deeper discussion about the sovereignty of the 
individual provinces in Canada, stating, “[a]s a rule, intergovernmental agreements 
allow individual provinces to opt out if they are not concluded bilaterally between 
the federal government and an individual province.” Because the federal law 
implements FATCA, all provinces are included). 
 103.  See An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in 
Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-31 (Can.) 
(noting that the enacted Canadian law is substantially similar to the U.S.-Canada 
IGA, including its lack of the non-discrimination clause). 
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criticism and public opposition.104 The Canadian law implementing 
FATCA became obligated to meet the standards set forth by the 
ICCPR once the bilateral IGA between the United States and Canada 
resulted in Canadian federal law.105 
B. CANADA’S FATCA VIOLATES ARTICLE 26 OF THE ICCPR, 
BECAUSE IT CANNOT “GUARANTEE” U.S PERSONS PROTECTION 
FROM DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL ORIGIN 
WITHOUT AN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CLAUSE. 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury added an anti-discrimination 
clause to the U.S. Model specifically because public comments, 
reports, and studies revealed the likelihood that FFIs would refuse to 
open new financial accounts and maintain existing accounts for 
Americans abroad, in order to avoid FATCA’s reach.106 Canada’s 
reason for omitting the anti-discrimination clause from its final 
legislation implementing FATCA is unclear;107 however, Canada is a 
 104.  See, e.g., Browning, supra note 9 (quoting finance executives from 
Washington, D.C., Australia, Switzerland, Hong Kong, and Canada, all speaking 
out against FATCA); FATCA and the Canada-U.S. Intergovernmental Agreement 
(IGA): Information for Clients, CANADIAN BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.cba.ca/ 
en/consumer-information/40-banking-basics/597-fatca-and-the-canada-us-
intergovernmental-agreement-iga-information-for-clients (last modified July 2, 
2014) [hereinafter FATCA Information for Clients] (“We understand that the U.S. 
government is attempting to reduce tax evasion, but we have publicly opposed 
FATCA as the wrong way to go about it.”). 
 105.  Benz, supra note 101, at 101. 
 106.  See T.D. 9610, 2013-15 I.R.B. (noting the addition of the anti-
discrimination clause in response to public comments received about FATCA). 
The U.S. Congress contemplated the discriminatory consequences of FATCA, as 
demonstrated by the February 2013 introduction of H.R. Bill 597, the 
“Commission on Americans Living Abroad Act.” See Commission on Americans 
Living Abroad Act, H.R. 597, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013) (intending to establish a 
commission to study how federal laws and policies affect U.S. citizens living in 
foreign countries); id. (“Federal policies and requirements that affect the ability of 
a United States citizen living in a foreign country to access foreign and domestic 
financial institutions, including requirements under chapter 4 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (commonly known as the ‘Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act.’)”). 
 107.  The law implementing Canada’s FATCA provides:  
(1) Beginning on or before July 1, 2014, the Financial Institution must have policies 
and procedures . . . to prevent the Financial Institution from providing a Financial 
Account to any Nonparticipating Financial Institution and to monitor whether the 
Financial Institution opens or maintains a Financial Account for any Specified U.S. 
Person who is not a resident of Canada . . . . 
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country with strong negotiating and bargaining power,108 and 
presumably would choose to apply the law with as little consequence 
to Canadian business and economy as possible. 
Still, the effects of the omission are clear and the problems 
FATCA has caused for U.S. persons in Canada are far-reaching.109 
Since enactment of the law, Americans in Canada (and others 
defined as “U.S. persons” under FATCA) have complained that 
banks are locking them out, refusing to open new accounts, and that 
they are unable to access basic financial services.110 Some Americans 
in Canada have found themselves unable to open retirement planning 
(2) Such policies and procedures must provide that if any Financial Account held by a 
Specified U.S. Person . . . is identified, the Financial Institution must report such 
Financial Account as would be required if the Financial Institution were a Reporting 
Canadian Financial Institution . . . or close such Financial Account. 
An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in Parliament on 
February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-31, § III(A)(1)-(2) 
(Can.) (emphasis added). But see FATCA Information for Clients, supra note 104 
(responding to the question, “Do U.S. account holders face discrimination or the 
possibility of having their accounts closed?” with “No. The FATCA requirement 
that Canadian financial institutions close accounts or refuse to offer services to 
U.S. persons in certain circumstances has been eliminated under the IGA.”). 
 108.  See Brown & O’Brien, supra note 77, at 204 (describing Canada as a 
wealthy, capital-exporting nation with the ability to diverge from model 
agreements). 
 109.  See, e.g., Drew Hasselback, Anti-FATCA Group Hires U.S. Lawyer, FIN. 
POST (Oct. 29, 2014), http://business.financialpost.com/2014/10/29/anti-fatca-
group-hires-u-s-lawyer/ (discussing renunciation as a means to avoid FATCA 
consequences is an increasingly expensive option, since the U.S. Department of 
State raised the fee to renounce citizenship from $450 to $2,350); 73% of 
Americans Abroad Consider Giving Up Passport Due to FATCA, VALUE WALK 
(Oct. 26, 2014), http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/10/americans-renounce-
citizenship-fatca/#comments (“[M]any non-U.S. banks and other financial 
institutions will no longer work with Americans which can make living outside the 
U.S. achingly complicated.”); Robert W. Wood, Canadians File Suit to Block 
FATCA and Prohibit Handover of U.S. Names to IRS, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/08/12/canadians-file-suit-to-block-
fatca-and-prohibit-handover-of-u-s-names/ (reporting on a legal claim filed stating 
that FATCA violates equal protection of the law without discrimination). 
 110.  See American Citizens Abroad Comments on FATCA, BLOOMBERG BNA 
TAX & ACCOUNTING CTR. (Feb. 8, 2012), available at https://americansabroad.org/ 
files/6813/4192/6083/acastatementapril2012s.pdf (commenting that “FATCA has 
turned Americans abroad into pariahs in the international financial world” and 
“[d]ue to FATCA, foreign banks accounts are being closed”). The Annex to the 
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and investment opportunities, access job and rental opportunities, 
utilize tax planning services, or seek other tax advantages available 
to Canadians.111 Indeed, NPR reported in early 2014 that as a result 
of the law, foreign banks have “decided to wash their hands of 
American account-holders. . . . Congress wanted to catch tax cheats. 
But the net also snagged Americans whose foreign bank accounts let 
them pay their bills in the countries they now call home.”112 Without 
an anti-discrimination clause—or at least some form of anti-
discriminatory protection—in the law, Canada cannot uphold its duty 
to “guarantee” all persons protection from impermissible 
discrimination, as required by ICCPR article 26. 
1. Burdensome Costs of Implementing FATCA in Canada 
Incentivizes and Permits Discrimination Rather than Guarding 
Against it. 
Complying with FATCA has not been an insignificant undertaking 
for foreign governments and financial institutions. In Canada, where 
the population of American citizens is approximately one million—
the highest population of Americans outside of the United States113—
the law’s effects are particularly consequential. FATCA has cost 
Canadian banks approximately $750 million Canadian dollars in due 
diligence and preparation expenses as of July 2014.114 Rough 
estimates show that average compliance cost is approximately five to 
ten million dollars per financial institution, or an aggregate total of 
one to two trillion dollars.115 Despite the law’s intention to reduce 
 111.  See, e.g., Cain, Dual Citizens, supra note 62 (complaining of Canadian 
Charter violations). 
 112.  Shapiro, supra note 1. 
 113.  See Rita Trichur, U.S. Expats Sue Over Canadian Deal to Tell Washington 
About Their Accounts, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/ 
expats-in-canada-sue-over-u-s-effort-to-collect-taxes-abroad-1407856738 
[hereinafter Trichur, U.S. Expats]. 
 114.  Rita Trichur, Canada Banks Tally Their Tax-Compliance Tab, WALL ST. J. 
(July 27, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/canada-banks-tally-their-tax- 
compliance-tab-1406504252 [hereinafter Trichur, Canada Banks]. 
 115.  See Peter R. Altenburger et al., FATCA: U.S. Legislation with Broad 
Consequences for Many, SWISS-AM. CHAMBER COM. (Sept. 11, 2010), 
http://www.amcham.ch/members_interests/p_business_ch.asp?s=7&c= (noting 
that the expense is recognized to be greater than its immediate returns); see also 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN AN AMENDMENT TO THE SENATE 
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legal impediments of compliance,116 these costs are cripplingly and 
preventatively high for many institutions.117 
As a result, it is unsurprising that some FFIs, especially small, 
provincial banks who typically only serve a limited number of 
clients, simply cannot afford to maintain U.S. persons as customers 
under the new law. To address this, Canada’s FATCA specifically 
considers such institutions (termed “local banks”) to be “deemed-
compliant.”118 This means that those banks that have less than fifty 
million dollars in assets on their balance sheets, are not-for-profit 
(e.g., certain credit unions and co-ops) and as long as they do not 
target U.S. clientele (among other requirements), they do not have to 
implement procedures to comply with the law.119 
Therefore, it is only the larger, for profit, nonexempt Canadian 
financial institutions that are caught in FATCA’s web—the same 
institutions that would most likely be expected to uphold anti-
discriminatory policies and practices. Without an anti-discrimination 
clause in the agreement, they are seemingly permitted to make the 
choice: serve U.S. customers (and pay to comply with the law) or 
refuse them (and avoid the implementation costs).120 So long as the 
cost of managing American business under FATCA exceeds the cost 
of losing American business altogether, these institutions have an 
economic incentive to choose the latter. 
AMENDMENT TO THE HOUSE AMENDMENT TO THE SENATE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 
2847, THE “HIRING INCENTIVES TO RESTORE EMPLOYMENT ACT” 6-10 (2010) 
(providing estimated numbers for 2010 through 2020); Trichur, Canada Banks, 
supra note 114 (stating that the Treasury anticipates $729 million in annual 
revenue from the law). 
 116.  T.D. 9610, 2013-15 I.R.B. 768. 
 117.  See Behrens, supra note 42, at 217 (“The high cost of compliance . . . 
simply outweighs the benefits of FATCA.”). 
 118.  See An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in 
Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-31, § 
III(A)-(C) (Can.). 
 119.  Id. § III(C)(3). 
 120.  See, e.g., The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), DLA PIPER 
LLP 3, http://files.dlapiper.com/files/Uploads/Documents/FATCA-Alert.pdf 
(“Many FFIs no longer are accepting US accountholders or making it very 
expensive for a US holder to open an account.”) (last visited Feb. 18, 2015); Why 
FATCA is Bad for America-Update, AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, https://americans 
abroad.org/issues/fatca/fatca-bad-america/ (last updated Aug. 29, 2014) (“Because 
of [FATCA], some foreign banks have refused to do business with Americans.”). 
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To the extent that Canadian financial institutions have refused to 
deal with U.S. accountholders, it is likely because FATCA’s 
burdensome costs incentivize such discrimination.121 Thus, because 
Canada removed the only provision that would have safeguarded 
Americans from this discriminatory treatment, with no other 
safeguard employed to replace it, Canada’s FATCA does not meet 
the bar of guaranteeing effective protection of U.S. persons from 
discrimination on the basis of their national origin, as required by 
article 26 of the ICCPR.122 
C. CANADA’S FAILURE TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE RIGHTS 
PROTECTED BY THE ICCPR THROUGH ADEQUATE LEGISLATION 
ALSO VIOLATES ICCPR ARTICLE 2. 
Canada’s decision not to enact an anti-discrimination clause would 
not run afoul of ICCPR article 2 if other existing legislation already 
provided similar protection.123 In Canada, there are at least three 
existing laws that appear to provide anti-discriminatory protections: 
(1) the U.S.-Canada ITC’s preexisting “Nondiscrimination 
Article”124; (2) the Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations, 
which prohibit Canadian banks from requiring identification more 
than those enumerated in the law;125 and (3) the Canadian Charter, 
which prevents discrimination on the basis of, among other protected 
classes, national origin.126 However, none of these laws provide  
  
 121.  See, e.g., Scott D. Michel & H. David Rosenbloom, FATCA and Foreign 
Bank Accounts: Has the U.S. Overreached?, VIEWPOINTS, May 30, 2011, at 709 
(“[I]t is becoming more and more apparent that in the well-intentioned effort to 
find tax cheats hiding money overseas, the U.S. government has not only 
overplayed its hand, but has enacted an extensive and expensive new regulatory 
scheme that defies common sense.”). 
 122.  ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 26. 
 123.  Article 2(2) of the ICCPR states: 
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to 
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant. 
Id. art. 2(2). 
 124.  See Income Tax Convention, supra note 14, art. 8. 
 125.  Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations, SOR/2003-184 (Can.). 
 126.  Canadian Charter, supra note 65, c. 11, § 15. 
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unambiguous protection for U.S. persons who will be unable to open 
and maintain financial accounts as a result of FATCA. 
First, the U.S.-Canada ITC contains a “Nondiscrimination 
Article.”127 The article protects individuals in each treaty country 
specifically from discriminatory taxation, i.e., tax laws in either 
country that would result in double taxation of the same income.128 
The article provides that in Canada, U.S. nationals must not be 
subjected to “more burdensome” taxation than similarly situated 
Canadian nationals.129 Likewise, the remaining provisions of the 
article specify that certain classes of individuals (such as married 
persons), entities, and payments (such as the deductibility of certain 
types of expenses) shall not be subjected to discriminatory 
taxation.130 
However, this Nondiscrimination Article has no relation to the 
kind of discrimination at hand.131 It does not provide protection in the 
case of opening and maintaining financial accounts, as the U.S. 
Model anti-discrimination clause attempts to provide,132  and as a 
result, U.S. persons in Canada are not protected from discrimination 
under this article. 
 
Second, Canadian laws that seemingly give effect to the ICCPR’s 
protection from discrimination include the Access to Basic Banking 
 127.  Income Tax Convention, supra note 14, art. XXV. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  See STEF VAN WEEGHEL, THE IMPROPER USE OF TAX TREATIES: WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES 36 
(1998) (“Non-discrimination Articles which are based on the OECD Model 
Conventions furthermore contain specific provisions relating to non-discriminatory 
taxation in respect of permanent establishments, to deductibility of certain 
payments, including royalty and interest payments.”); see also Manal Corwin, 
Treasury Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Opening Statement at the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations (June 7, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/Documents/OTPTest-2011-6-7-Corwin-SenFR.pdf (discussing 
the non-discrimination article as preventing discriminatory taxation only in the 
context of the application of the tax code). 
 132.  See Arthur J. Cockfield, The Limits of the International Tax Regime As a 
Commitment Projector, 33 VA. TAX R. 59, 105 (2013) (“The fact that FATCA . . . 
focus[es] on reporting and penalties for nonreporting (instead of new tax 
measures), however, may mean that the tax treaty, which only covers taxation 
measures, will not offer relief to U.S. persons living in Canada.”). 
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Services Regulations.133 The ABBS provides some indirect 
protection to U.S. persons, along with other nonresidents living in 
Canada, from financial institutions turning them away by limiting the 
type of identification that banks can require to open an account.134 
U.S.-identifying information is not included within the list of 
identification sources; therefore, a bank would seemingly be unable 
to require it in order to open an account. 
However, in this respect, the ABBS directly conflicts with 
FATCA’s requirement that all financial institutions request and 
receive documentation that will confirm whether each accountholder 
is a “U.S. Reportable Account.”135 Although the ABBS may continue 
to be applicable for non-U.S. accountholders, such as nonresidents 
living in Canada, it will not provide protection to U.S. persons under 
FATCA, because the law implementing FATCA will override the 
ABBS.136 
Finally, the Canadian Charter, passed in 1982, contains an equal 
protection clause that protects individuals from discrimination by the 
government. 137 Consistent with the ICCPR, the Charter specifically 
guarantees protection from discrimination on the basis of national 
origin.138 
 133.  See Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations, SOR/2003-184 (Can.) 
(limiting ID requirements to a Canadian drivers’ license, Canadian passport, or 
Canadian certificate of citizenship, and other Canadian documents.). The exclusive 
list does not include proof regarding U.S. citizenship or residency. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  An Act to Implement Certain Provisions of the Budget Tabled in 
Parliament on February 11, 2014 and Other Measures, R.S.C. 2014, c. C-31, art. 
4(1)(a) (Can.). 
 136.  In fact, a primary reason for federal passage of the U.S.-Canada IGA was 
to respond to concerns that direct implementation of FATCA by Canadian 
financial institutions would conflict with local laws that prohibit banks from 
collecting and disclosing such information. 
 137.  See Canadian Charter, supra note 65, c. 11, § 15 (“Every individual is 
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal 
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination 
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.”); see, e.g., Cain, Dual Citizens, supra note 62 (alleging 
violations of civil rights under article 15 of Canadian Charter). 
 138.  See Canadian Charter, supra note 65, c. 11, § 15 (“Every individual is 
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal 
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However, the law’s passage does not necessarily give rise to the 
protections under the law. The ICCPR draws this distinction in 
article 2 by stating Canada must also “take the necessary steps . . . to 
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect 
to the rights.”139 The ABBS is an example of a law that Canada 
adopted to give effect to the rights protected by the Charter (albeit 
not the rights Americans need protected as a result of FATCA).140 
Simply passing the Charter does not solve the problem; it is 
incumbent upon Canadian lawmakers to pass specific legislation that 
carries out the guarantees of the Charter. 
Including the anti-discrimination clause of the U.S. Model, at a 
minimum, would help give effect to the rights protected by the 
Charter and the ICCPR. Canada’s FATCA, absent the anti-
discrimination clause, has not given effect to the rights that all 
individuals in Canada should enjoy. Consequently, the existing 
legislation in Canada violates article 2 of the ICCPR. 
1. Omitting the Anti-Discrimination Clause Does Not Further 
FATCA’s Stated Purpose; Therefore, an Exception to the ICCPR 
Does Not Apply. 
In international law jurisprudence, just as in domestic U.S. law, 
discrimination is permitted to a certain extent and in certain 
circumstances.141 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a law that 
discriminates (or impedes a fundamental right) must be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.142 Similarly, in 
 139.  ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 2(2). 
 140.  Access to Basic Banking Services Regulations, SOR/2003-184 (Can.). 
 141.  Holy Monasteries v. Greece, App. 13092/87, ¶ 92 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 9, 
1994). (“It is important to note that the right to non-discrimination does not 
prohibit all differences in treatment in the exercise of the rights and freedoms.”). 
See also Andrejeva v. Latvia, App. No. 55707/00, ¶ 81 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 18, 
2009); see, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Derksen v. Netherlands, Commc’n No. 
976/2001, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/976/2001 (2004); Human Rights 
Comm., Müller v. Namibia, Commc’n No. 919/2000, ¶ 6.7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/74/D/919/2000 (1999); Human Rights Comm., Pauger v. Austria, 
Commc’n No. 716/1996, ¶ 7.3 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/65/D/716/1996 (1999); Human 
Rights Comm., Broeks v. Netherlands, Commc’n No. 172/1984, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990); Human Rights Comm., Vos v. Netherlands, Commc’n No. 
218/1986, ¶ 11.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/35/D/218/1986 (1989); see also Andrejeva 
v. Latvia, App. No. 55707/00, ¶ 81 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 18, 2009).  
 142.  See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that parents’ 
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cases before the HRC, which reviews international human rights 
violations under the ICCPR, the HRC emphasizes a parallel 
standard.143 
For example, in Fedotova v. Russian Fed’n,144 the Russian 
government convicted the plaintiff, a gay rights activist, of violating 
an ordinance prohibiting public actions aimed at “the propaganda of 
[homosexuality] among minors.”145 In review of the legal argument, 
the HRC reminded the international community of its jurisprudence 
that “not every differentiation based on the grounds listed in article 
26 of the [ICCPR] amounts to discrimination, as long as it is based 
on reasonable and objective criteria, in pursuit of an aim that is 
legitimate.”146 The HRC noted that in this instance, although the 
Russian law pursued a legitimate state interest—the protection of 
public morals, health, rights and interests of minors—it was not 
based on reasonable and objective criteria; the law only prosecuted 
propaganda of homosexuality, as opposed to propaganda of both 
heterosexuality and homosexuality.147 The HRC found this 
distinction unjustifiable, concluded that Russia violated the  
  
fundamental right to freedom of religion outweighed the state’s interest in 
educating children); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the First 
Amendment of the Constitution required the government to demonstrate a 
compelling interest before denying unemployment compensation); Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that laws permitting the compulsory 
sterilization of criminals are unconstitutional if the sterilization law treats similar 
crimes differently). 
 143.  See ICCPR, supra note 17. In accordance with the ICCPR Protocol, the 
HRC reviews claims of alleged ICCPR violations and issues reports of its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. 
 144.  Human Rights Comm., Fedotova v. Russian Fed., Commc’n No. 
1932/2010, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/106/D/1932/2010 (2012). 
 145.  Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 10.6. The plaintiff argued to the HRC that the bar on 
“propaganda” violated her right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation under article 26 of the ICCPR when she was victimized for 
holding posters that declared “I am proud of my homosexuality” and 
“Homosexuality is normal” during a peaceful gay pride assembly in Moscow. Id. 
¶¶ 2.2, 3.4. 
 146.  Id. ¶ 10.6. 
 147.  See id. (noting that there was no evidence that allowed for making a 
distinction between heterosexual and homosexual propaganda). 
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plaintiff’s article 26 rights, and compelled Russia to make the 
relevant provisions of the law compatible with the ICCPR.148 
In Canada, the stated legitimate objective of the U.S.-Canada ITC 
implementing FATCA is to prevent “evasion with respect to taxes on 
income and on capital,” including through the exchange of tax 
information.149 The omission of an anti-discrimination clause that 
would prevent financial institutions from employing “policies or 
practices that discriminate against opening or maintaining Financial 
Accounts”150 for U.S. persons is inapposite to the government 
purpose for the law. The government interest of preventing tax 
evasion and promoting the exchange of tax information cannot be 
served when its target tax citizens—U.S. persons abroad—are 
prevented from opening and maintaining accounts abroad. 
Like the Russian ordinance that only targeted homosexual 
propaganda among minors as opposed to all sexual propaganda 
among minors, the omission of the anti-discrimination clause from 
Canada’s FATCA only permits closing of accounts held by U.S. 
persons, as opposed to an objective criterion, such as permitting the 
closing of accounts held by all noncompliant accountholders (which 
is already a FATCA requirement).151 Therefore, omission of the U.S. 
Model anti-discrimination clause is not rationally related to, or in 
furtherance of, FATCA’s stated purpose of preventing tax evasion. 
The HRC would hold that Canada must enact legislation prohibiting 
discriminatory treatment by banks or provide some other rational 
reason why this government sanctioned imposition of a fundamental 
right should be permissible under the ICCPR. 
D. THE VIENNA CONVENTION INSTRUCTS THE SUPREME COURT 
OF CANADA TO VIEW THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CLAUSE OF THE 
U.S. MODEL FATCA AS PERSUASIVE. 
A strong body of recent Canadian case law concludes that tax 
treaty interpretation includes not only language of the relevant tax 
 148.  See id. ¶¶ 10.7-12. 
 149.  See Income Tax Convention, supra note 14, art. 30 (providing an 
alternative means of meeting the U.S. objectives under FATCA—by relying on 
existing provisions for information exchange under the Canada-U.S. ITC). 
 150.  Annex II, supra note 11, at 6. 
 151.  See 26 U.S.C. § 1471(f)(2) (2010) (requiring the closure of any 
noncompliant accounts without a waiver). 
 
  
2015]  “AMERICANS: WE LOVE YOU, BUT WE CAN’T AFFORD YOU” 641 
treaty, but extrinsic materials that aid the interpretation of the treaty 
as well.152 In Crown Forest Indus. Ltd. v. Canada,153 the Supreme 
Court of Canada stated that the ITC between Canada and the United 
States was based on the OECD Model Convention and held that the 
OECD Model of 1977 and OECD Commentaries had “high 
persuasive value” in interpreting the definition of the word “resident” 
in the treaty.154 Particularly illustrative of this rule, in TD Sec. (USA) 
LLC the Tax Court of Canada held that OECD documents could be 
used as extrinsic aids to interpret a tax treaty.155 In that case, the court 
found that a key instrument of the Canada-U.S. ITC at issue was the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury’s  Technical Explanation, which the 
Canadian government recognized as an accurate reflection of 
understandings reached in the course of negotiations regarding the 
interpretation and application of the treaty.156 The Tax Court 
explained that the U.S. Treasury Technical Explanation provides a 
“workable” solution consistent with the purpose and context of the 
Treaty.157 
Because the Vienna Convention calls for the interpretation of 
treaties to include not only the text of treaties but also the context of 
the treaty, the Supreme Court of Canada may give official Model 
Agreements, such as the U.S. Model FATCA Agreement, high 
persuasive value if the Court analyzes the intention of the U.S.-
Canada ITC implementing FATCA. 
In addition, some tax treaties are explicitly required to meet the 
obligations of human rights conventions. The United Kingdom, for 
example, passed the Human Rights Act of 1988, which required that 
 152.  Accord Am. Income Life Ins. Co. v. R, [2008] D.T.C. 3631 (Can.) (finding 
that the OECD Model and U.N. Models aided interpretation of the U.S.-Canada 
ITC and drew the inference that the absence of an “insurance clause” from the 
OECD Model and Canada’s treaty with the United States indicated that the drafters 
of the treaty intended not to include the U.N. Model’s insurance clause). 
 153.  [1995] S.C.R. 802 (Can). 
 154.  Id. at 803. 
 155.  See id. at 815; see also Knights of Columbus v. R., [2008] T.C.C. 307 
(Can.). 
 156.  But see TONNY SCHENK-GEERS, INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF 
INFORMATION AND THE PROTECTION OF TAXPAYERS 36 (2009) (“Parliamentary 
documents in the individual states, such as Explanatory Memoranda, going with 
the concept treaties in the ratification process, do not form part of the context in the 
sense of the Vienna Convention.”). 
 157.  TD Sec. (USA) LLC, 5 C.T.C. at 12. 
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all U.K. legislation be read and given effect in a way that is 
compatible with other U.K. law, including compliance with the 
European Convention on Human Rights of 1951.158 Commentators 
have stated that this would increasingly impact issues related to the 
exchange of information and certain provisions of tax treaties.159 
Here, if a civil suit alleging discrimination under the U.S.-Canada 
ITC implementing FATCA reaches the Supreme Court of Canada, 
the Court should view the U.S. Model FATCA Agreement as a 
persuasive document revealing some valuable context of the treaty. 
The U.S. Model’s inclusion of an anti-discrimination clause shows 
the United States intends that FATCA be implemented with attached 
anti-discrimination protection for U.S. persons abroad. Although not 
binding, and perhaps only as persuasive as the ultimate decision 
between the treaty negotiators to omit the clause, the inclusion of the 
protection shows that negotiators contemplated the harm caused to 
U.S. persons seeking to maintain or open financial accounts in 
Canada and should be addressed in one form or another. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The ability for a U.S. taxpayer abroad to avoid a tax obligation 
through misinformation, improper filing, or nondisclosure of foreign-
held assets and income has created the need for more aggressive U.S. 
tax collection efforts.160 However, this need should not supersede an 
individual’s right to access basic banking and financial services. 
While it is clear that Canada was not agreeable to passing 
FATCA,161 and would want to limit the obligations created for 
Canadian financial institutions, this does not excuse leaving open to 
interpretation whether Canadian financial institutions can institute 
policies and practices that discriminate against U.S. persons in 
Canada. Canadian and U.S. lawmakers who negotiated the final 
agreement implementing FATCA in Canada may reveal that the 
omission of the anti-discrimination clause was not intended to permit 
 158.  SCHWARZ, supra note 78, at 128. 
 159.  Id. (citing to Percival v. Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & 
Customs, [2013] UKFTT 240 (TC) as an example of an attempt to “impugn the 
terms of a treaty by operation of the European Convention on Human Rights”). 
 160.  See discussion infra Part II(A) (discussing the problems with voluntary 
compliance for U.S. persons abroad). 
 161.  See discussion infra Part II(B)(1). 
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such discriminatory behavior; that, rather, the lawmakers only 
intended to permit Canadian financial institutions—a private 
marketplace—to choose who its clientele should be, based on the 
expensive due diligence demands that are attached to FATCA. If a 
bank cannot “afford” U.S. customers because of FATCA, then 
perhaps the bank should not be required to take on the customer. 
However, when Canadian lawmakers chose to pass FATCA, and 
recognized that discrimination was inevitable, the legislators should 
have employed other remedies (whether legislative, administrative, 
or judicial) to counteract foreseeable unlawful discrimination. Some 
feasible remedies include enacting the U.S. Model’s anti-
discrimination clause, demanding that the United States subsidize the 
cost of implementing FATCA, or reducing the cost of U.S. 
expatriation. 
A. CANADA’S FATCA SHOULD BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS. 
One of three solutions to alleviate the discrimination U.S. persons 
abroad face is to amend the Canadian law implementing FATCA 
under the U.S.-Canada ITC to include the anti-discrimination clause 
of the U.S. Model FATCA Agreement or a substantially similar anti-
discrimination clause.162 If Canada adopted the U.S. Model’s clause, 
the clause would state: “The Financial Institution must not have 
policies or practices that discriminate against opening or maintaining 
Financial Accounts for individuals who are Specified U.S. Persons 
and residents of [Canada].”163 
The anti-discrimination clause would provide compliant U.S. 
citizens in Canada with unambiguous protection from 
discrimination.164 Although the clause may not stop all, or even most, 
instances of discrimination in practice,165 at least those who 
experience account closings or refusals, despite being compliant with 
FATCA requirements, would have a source of recourse under the 
 162.  See Annex II, supra note 11, at 6. 
 163.  See id. 
 164.  See id. 
 165.  See, e.g., Michel & Rosenbloom, supra note 121 (recounting stories of 
American citizens who have been shut out by their foreign banks in Switzerland 
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U.S.-Canada ITC. 
B. THE COST OF FATCA SHOULD BE SUBSIDIZED BY THE UNITED 
STATES, OR THE COST OF U.S. EXPATRIATION REDUCED. 
It is clear that the cause of the discriminatory treatment is not U.S. 
citizenship alone, but the exceedingly high cost of FATCA 
compliance, which is attached to U.S. citizenship.166 Therefore, 
another option is for the United States to subsidize the cost of 
FATCA implementation in Canada. Given that FATCA originated in 
the United States, the United States should consider subsidizing the 
cost for this American-made imposition. If the expensive burden is 
somewhat alleviated through a subsidy, banks would not be forced to 
turn away U.S. customers. 
In the alternative, if FATCA’s due diligence and compliance costs 
are not subsidized, and U.S. persons abroad continue to face 
discrimination, then the cost of expatriating should be made more 
affordable. Recently, the cost of expatriation in Canada rose from 
$450 to $2,350 (U.S. dollars).167 This cost is prohibitively expensive 
for some.168 In addition, the current wait to expatriate from the 
United States in Canada can take over a year.169 Although the 
solution of relinquishing U.S. citizenship mischaracterizes the 
problem (a U.S. citizen should not have to change who he or she is in 
order to avoid unlawful discrimination), if a U.S. citizen decides to 
expatriate, it should be more affordable to do so.170 Of course, 
relinquishing citizenship may not end the discrimination altogether, 
 166.  See Trichur, U.S. Expats, supra note 113 (claiming the implementation of 
FATCA costs Canadian banks a total of $750 million dollars). 
 167.  See Patrick Cain, Meet the Alberta Man Who Went to Tijuana to Renounce 
His U.S. Citizenship, GLOBAL NEWS (Nov. 18, 2014), http://globalnews.ca/news/ 
1671945/meet-the-alberta-man-who-went-to-tijuana-to-renounce-his-u-s-
citizenship/ [hereinafter Cain, Meet the Alberta Man] (stating the fee increase took 
effect on September 12, 2014). 
 168.  See id. (noting that a man traveled from Canada to Mexico to renounce his 
citizenship and saved $1,800 doing so). 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  See Helena Bachmann, Mister Taxman: Why Some Americans Working 
Abroad Are Ditching Their Citizenships, TIME (Jan. 31, 2013), http://world. 
time.com/2013/01/31/mister-taxman-why-some-americans-working-abroad-are-
ditching-their-citizenships (commenting that famous singer-performer Tina 
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especially if there are still U.S. indicators present in an individual’s 
account, such as a U.S. address or spouse who is a U.S. citizen or 
resident.171 
C. THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE SHOULD FIND THAT 
CANADA’S FATCA VIOLATES THE ICCPR. 
Finally, without a legislative or administrative remedy available, 
another remedy for victims of discrimination is through the court 
system. Victims can file a complaint to the HRC alleging a violation 
of their civil rights as guaranteed under the ICCPR articles 2(2) and 
26.172 To be actionable under the ICCPR, plaintiffs must exhaust all 
administrative remedies available in Canada, which includes first 
filing a complaint in Canadian courts alleging violation of the 
Canadian Charter.173 
In at least one instance, the argument that the Canadian law 
implementing FATCA violates the Canadian Charter’s equal 
protection clause has been put forward in a civil complaint.174 On 
August 11, 2014, two Canadians with dual citizenship in the U.S. 
and Canada sued the Canadian federal government for signing the 
Canadian law implementing FATCA.175 The plaintiffs are two 
professional Ontario women who were born in the United States, but 
have lived in Canada since they were five and have never worked in 
the United States or filed U.S. tax returns.176 In their complaint, they 
allege that the collection and disclosure of their personal information 
to the U.S. government violates basic principles and civil rights 
guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, including the right to “the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination . . . 
based on race, national or ethnic origin.”177 The treatment and 
outcome of this complaint will reveal whether filing a civil suit 
 171.  See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, 2011-19 I.R.B. (including as reportable under 
the law U.S. citizens, individuals with a joint accountholder with U.S. indicators, 
individuals with a U.S. residence address or a U.S. correspondence address, and 
individuals with a power of attorney or signatory authority granted to a person with 
a U.S. address). 
 172.  See ICCPR, supra note 17, arts. 2, 26. 
 173.  See id. 
 174.  See Cain, Meet the Alberta Man, supra note 167. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id.; Canadian Charter, supra note 65, c. 11, § 15(1). 
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exhausts all administrative actions. 
Because the ICCPR guarantees protection against discrimination 
“on any ground such as . . . national or social origin, . . . birth or 
other status,”178 the HRC will likely find that the absence of an anti-
discrimination clause from the U.S.-Canada ITC, and the subsequent 
discrimination based on national origin caused by the law, violates 
the civil rights protected by the ICCPR. In the face of such disparate 
treatment of U.S. citizens in Canada, the HRC should require Canada 
to actively take measures to guarantee the civil protection and 
nondiscriminatory treatment of individuals within its jurisdiction. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Canada has the highest number of U.S. citizens living in its 
jurisdiction outside of the United States. In Canada more than 
anywhere else, an anti-discrimination clause is necessary to protect 
U.S. persons who are vulnerable to discrimination under FATCA. 
Despite the presence of applicable laws that provide general 
protections against discrimination, the lack of an anti-discrimination 
clause in Canada’s FATCA agreement creates ambiguity as to how 
financial institutions are permitted to treat U.S. persons under the 
law. 
Although an anti-discrimination provision would impose 
FATCA’s costly compliance expenses on Canadian financial 
institutions, the solution is not to simply circumvent FATCA. If a 
country is going to pass FATCA into law, the law should properly 
place the burden of the legislation in the right place. The burden 
belongs not with the compliant U.S. persons living abroad who have 
a fundamental right to be free from discrimination, but with the 
government that believes easy access to information will help find 
noncompliant taxpayers. Even in the context of international tax 
compliance and tax treaties, it is necessary that human rights, 
including the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of 
one’s national origin, be properly balanced with the needs of a 
growing, complex economy. 
 178.  ICCPR, supra note 17, arts. 2, 26. 
 
